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MOBILE HOMES: A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO
WEST VIRGINIA'S HOUSING PROBLEMS
The development of the mobile home in the American housing
industry spans fifty years of growth-evolving from a small vaca-
tioner's home into a modem residence affording all of the ameni-
ties of conventional single family homes.' It has become a perma-
nent pattern of life, considered by owner-occupants to be servica-
ble and economical housing. At the same time, the nomadic occu-
pants of fifty years ago have become stable and permanent citizens
in their communities.
2
Nationwide, the 1970 census found that 7,750,000 persons re-
sided in mobile homes, while a 1972 survey reported that mobile
homes accounted for eighty percent of all single family homes sell-
ing for less than $20,000 and forty-five percent of all single family
homes sold at any price.
A statewide housing survey indicates that West Virginia must
provide, through new construction or rehabilitation, approxi-
mately 334,975 housing units during the 1970-1985 period to insure
adequate housing for all low and moderate income households by
1985. Of the existing housing stock in the state, as much as twenty-
seven percent of the housing units in West Virginia have been
found to be substandard.4 That the conventional housing industry
cannot meet this need is evidenced by the fact that, in West Vir-
ginia, sixty percent of all new residential units sold between 1970
and 1975 were mobile homes. With the strong preference for single
family housing frustrated by the increasing costs and acute shor-
tage of conventional dwellings, mobile homes have become a viable
alternative for many residents of West Virginia.5
Yet, despite increasing federal and state recognition of the
urgent need for low and middle income housing and the enactment
of both federal and state housing acts,6 very little housing has been
I B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOME HoMEs 1-3 (3rd ed. 1974).
2 Id. at 7.
3Id. at 6.
' WEST VmoGiA HOUSING & DEVELoPMENT FUND, STATEWIDE HOUSING NEEDS
ANALYSIS FOR THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA (1977).
5Id.
6 Note, Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts & New Jersey, 7 HARv.
J. LEGIS. 246, 246 nn.1 & 2, 247 n.3 (1970) (a comprehensive list of federal and state
legislation). The legislature of West Virginia responded to the seriousness of the
housing situation by enacting the West Virginia Housing Development Fund in an
extraordinary session of the legislature in 1968.'W. VA. CODE §§ 31-18-1 to 25 (1975
1
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actually built under these programs. Studies have placed a large
part of the blame for this situation upon exclusionary zoning prac-
tices and building code regulations.7 While mobile homes, along
with modular and prefabricated housing, can be the solution to the
current housing needs, zoning practices may very well be the stum-
bling block.8
Most communities looked upon the early "house trailers" and
their tenants with distaste, finding both to be undesirable. They
were viewed as the source of three major problems: potential blight
to surrounding areas and depression of property values; the social
undesirability of their occupants (variously deemed to be "footless
and nomadic," "tourists and transients," or "migratory paupers");
and an unwelcome burden on municipal services. These house
trailers were small, constructed without any standards, and often
lacked water and sanitary facilities. They were generally placed in
crowded parks or camps, which seldom met even minimal health
and safety standards. Thus, mobile homes have been strictly regu-
lated or totally excluded because of these early conditions They
have variously been held to constitute a health hazard to the com-
munity, to affect detrimentally the general welfare of the com-
munity, and to place a severe strain on municipal services such as
schools, sewage and water systems, as well as police and fire pro-
tection. They have been cited for failure to pay a fair share of
municipal taxes and for overcrowding and congesting streets and
highways. Finally, aesthetic considerations play a major role in the
decisions of communities to exclude mobile homes. 0
The mobile home of today bears little resemblance to its pri-
mitive ancestor-it is much larger, completely furnished, and has
all of the conveniences of conventional housing. It is spacesaving
and efficient, requires little maintenance, and can be permanently
placed on a foundation. Yet, despite the many improvements in
Replacement Vol.). The legislature found a serious shortage of sanitary, decent and
safe residential housing for low and moderate income families, which could not be
met by private industry nor provided by individual political subdivisions. The
housing development fund was established to provide financing for private and
public development of low and moderate income housing.
I Note, Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts & New Jersey, 7 -hRv.
J. LEGis. 246, 246-47 (1970).
Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning & Taxation, 55 CORNELL L. Rzv. 491,
492 (1970).
1 Vickers v. Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), appeal dis-
missed & cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
," 2 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING & PLANNING § 19 (4th ed. 1978).
[Vol. 81
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mobile homes there has not been a corresponding change in the
attitudes of the local community. Most jurisdictions continue to
restrict the placement of mobile homes on private land, relegating
them to mobile home parks in semiresidential or commercial dis-
tricts, or prohibiting them completely."
Although housing is not a fundamental right either enumer-
ated or implicit in the Constitution, 2 the United States Supreme
Court has proclaimed that it is a basic "necessity of life.' 5 The
growing judicial and legislative concern for the pressing need for
quality, affordable housing, and the inability of the conventional
housing industry to meet that need, mandate a retreat from the
burdensome restrictions placed on mobile home use. As an increas-
ing number of jurisdictions have done, West Virginia must re-
examine the dated policies which continue to justify present zon-
ing practices.
Relevant to any zoning dispute is the power to zone. This note
will first examine the power granted to municipalities to regulate
land use, especially considering questions which are raised by the
statutes granting that power. Next, the policies considered by
municipalities in restricting or prohibiting mobile homes, as pro-
vided by case law, will be evaluated for their continuing validity.
Finally, the policies of those jurisdictions which have invalidated
exclusionary zoning ordinances will be considered in relation to
West Virginia's current zoning practices.
The Municipality's Power to Regulate
Municipalities have the power to regulate land uses, either as
an exercise of their general police power or under a specific delega-
tion of zoning power. Both methods are a delegation of the state's
powers to the local municipal governing bodies. Under early city
charters, West Virginia's municipalities were given broad police
powers to "prescribe and enforce ordinances and rules for the pur-
pose of protecting health, property, lives, decency, morality, clean-
liness and good order of the city," and to prohibit nuisances. 5
Id.
J2 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
m Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
1, 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 10, §§ 19.03, 19.04.
Is Charleston City Charter of 1921, ch. 4 W. Va. Acts 101 (amending 1915
charter). See also, Huntington City Charter of 1921, ch. 11 W. Va. Acts 291 (amend-
3
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Mobile homes were first regulated by communities under ordi-
nances enacted pursuant to grants of general police power, based
upon the possibility of potential health and safety hazards to the
general community. 6 Since mobile homes have generally been
found not to constitute nuisances per se, '7 it has been held that
muncipalities acting under their grant of police power may not
exclude this use completely, but are limited to regulation by per-
mit or to prohibiting their location outside of mobile home
parks.Y'7 With the advent of zoning, however, total prohibition of
land uses has been held to be a valid exercise of the delegated
power to zone."
The state's power to zone land is customarily granted to local
government subdivisions by enabling statutes. West Virginia's
enabling statute9 provides for the creation of city and county plan-
ning commissions to promote the orderly development of each gov-
erning unit and its environs. The state legislative objectives of
zoning are "to encourage local government to improve the present
health, safety, convenience and welfare of their citizens," to care-
fully develop future highway systems and new communities, to
provide for the needs of agriculture, industry and business, to in-
sure "that residential areas provide healthy surroundings for fam-
ily life," and to insure that the "growth of the community is com-
mensurate with and promotive of the efficient and economical use
ing 1919 charter); Clarksburg City Charter of 1921, ch. 6 W. Va. Acts 123 (amending
1917 charter).
,1 2 A. Rathkopf, supra note 10, § 19.03. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 8-12-5(23),
(44) (1976 Replacement Vol.) (in which municipalities are given the power to pro-
vide for the elimination of hazards to public health and safety, to abate public
nuisances, and to protect and promote public morals, safety, health and welfare).
" Smith v. Building Inspector, 346 Mich. 57, 77 N.W.2d 332 (1956); G-M
Realty, Inc. v. Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961).
".' West Virginia municipalities are specifically empowered "[t]o prohibit
with or without zoning the location of occupied house trailers or mobile homes in
certain residential areas." W. VA. CODE § 8-12-5(30) (1976 Replacement Vol.)
(emphasis added). By implication then, the legislature denies to municipalities the
power to totally exclude mobile homes from all areas of a municipality. (Under a
rule of statutory construction followed in West Virginia, the inclusion of one subject
or thing in a statute is the exclusion of all others. Evans v. Hutchinson, 214 S.E.2d
453, 458 (W. Va. 1975)). Statutory interpretation of this specific police power to
permit total exclusion of mobile homes would raise serious due process considera-
tions. Total exclusion attempted by a zoning ordinance would at least provide
procedural safeguards to property owners. See text accompanying notes 22 and 24
infra.
' 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 10, § 19.03.
" W. VA. CODE §§ 8-24-1 to 71 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
[Vol. 81
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of public funds." To further these objectives, regulatory powers
and authority are granted to the local governing bodies. 0
The planning commission is designed to serve in an advisory
capacity to the local governing body and is authorized to formulate
and recommend a comprehensive zoning plan for land uses within
its jurisdiction." After holding a public hearing on the plan,22 it is
then submitted to the local governing body for adoption.? Follow-
ing its adoption or enactment, the voters affected by the plan may
petition for a referendum. Residents of the area affected by the
plan may then endorse or reject the plan subsequent to its enact-
ment by the governing body.
2
Although the current statute limits zoning jurisdiction to the
corporate limits of the municipality,2 prior enabling acts author-
ized municipalities to maintain jurisdiction over any lands outside
of the municipality "which, in the opinion of the commission,
bears relation to the planning of the municipality," but limited to
that deemed reasonably necessary to protect both the community
and its environs. 21 Under the current statute, municipalities that
have exercised such extraterritorial jurisdiction continue to retain
such powers.? A new municipality's power is thereby limited to its
corporate boundaries, while older communities may zone beyond
their corporate limits.
This enabling statute raises the question of the validity of
exclusionary or prohibitory zoning ordinances enacted by munici-
palities that have not adopted comprehensive zoning plans. May
a municipality single out for total exclusion a particular land use,
here, mobile homes, without providing for the regulation of all land
uses in a comprehensive plan? The significant contribution of the
comprehensive plan is that it precludes arbitrary discrimination as
to uses by considering the community as a whole.?8 Indeed, the
landmark case which established the constitutionality of zoning,
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,2 1 decided the issue of zoning within
a fact pattern which included a detailed comprehensive plan.
21 Id. at § 8-24-1.
21 Id. at §§ 8-24-1 to -16.
" Id. at § 8-24-18.
2 Id. at §§ 8-24-19 to -21.
21 Id. at § 8-24-48.
' Id. at § 8-24-26.
"0 W. VA. CODE § 8-5-13 (1931) (repealed in 1959).
" W. VA. CODE § 8-24-71 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
21 Aurora v. Bums, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
- 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
5
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It has been stated that land uses which are inherently socially
desirable may be excluded under comprehensive zoning schemes,
but cannot be excluded by special or piecemeal zoning ordi-
nances. 0 Unless West Virginia's communities declare mobile
homes to be nuisances per se, which would be against the weight
of authority,3 a single ordinance apparently may not be enacted
to totally exclude mobile homes in the absence of a comprehensive
zoning plan.
Although the Attorney General of West Virginia has indicated
that a comprehensive plan is not a prerequisite for the enactment
of subdivision regulations, subdivision control is a separate func-
tion of county and municipal governing' bodies.2 Therefore, this
discussion of the municipality's power to regulate subdivisions is
not conclusive of the need for a comprehensive plan for zoning and
would not appear to affect the regulation of mobile homes, unless
a mobile home park is developed as a subdivision. Thus, there
appears to be some doubt as to whether municipalities may law-
fully adopt an ordinance totally prohibiting, directly or indirectly,
the placement of mobile homes in the absence of a comprehensive
zoning plan intended to promote the purposes enumerated in the
statutory grant of power.
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Another aspect of West Virginia's enabling statute which mer-
its further inspection is the authority retained by certain munici-
palities to zone land which lies beyond their corporate limits. The
current statute allows municipalities which have exercised extra-
territorial zoning power as authorized by the 1931 Code to retain
that jurisdiction.?
Generally, the extraterritorial power to zone is granted to
municipalities for several reasons: to direct the development of
unincorporated land likely to be annexed in the future; to assist
cities in protecting land uses within city limits and close to the
boundary from conflicting uses outside the borders of the city; to
insure an orderly pattern of regional growth and to prevent a repe-
tition of past chaotic development; and to prevent dangerous and
' 8 McQuiLLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION §§ 25.79 - 25.81 (3rd ed. rev. vol.
1976). See also, note 17.1 supra.
31 G-M Realty, Inc. v. Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961).
12W. Va. Op. Att'y Gen., Aug. 13, 1969.
3 W. VA. CODE § 8-24-71 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
[Vol. 81
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unaesthetic development surrounding municipal core areas.34 Ena-
bling statutes such as West Virginia's seek to resolve the problems
of community development, which do not necessarily end at the
corporate limits of the municipality, by granting municipalities
extraterritorial zoning power."
Although these enabling statutes have been attacked as a de-
nial of due process, courts have almost unanimously sustained
their constitutionality. 6 These decisions are premised on the
theory of a municipality's derivation of power from the state legis-
lature. In exercising its governmental powers, a municipality acts
only as an agent of the state, having no power to act governmen-
tally without express authorization from the legislature. If consent
of the governed is a necessary prerequisite to the municipality's
jurisdiction over non-residents, arguably such consent is given by
the nonresident's representative in the state legislature.37 In a
recent voting rights case, however, the United States Supreme
Court rejected this theory of municipal derivation of state power:
While state legislatures exercise extensive power over their
constituents and over the various units of local government, the
States universally leave much policy and decision making to
their governmental subdivisions. Legislators enact many laws
but do not attempt to reach those countless matters of local
concern necessarily left wholly or partly to those who govern at
the local level. What is more, in providing for the governments
of their cities, counties, towns, and districts, the States charac-
teristically provide for representative government-for decision
making at the local level by representatives elected by the peo-
ple .... In a word, institutions of local government have al-
ways been a major aspect of our system, and their responsible
and responsive operation is today of increasing importance to
the quality of life of more and more of our citizens. We therefore
see little difference . . . between the exercise of state power
31 3 P. ROHAN, ZONNG & LAND USE CONTROLS § 20.01 (1978).
4 R. ANDERSON, Am. LAW OF ZONING § 23.06 (2d ed. 1977).
In Schlientz v. North Platte, 172 Neb. 477, 110 N.W.2d 58 (1961), the plain-
tiff contended that persons living within the zoning territory but outside the munic-
ipality's corporate limits suffered disenfranchisement in being subjected to the
jurisdiction of elected officials whom they had no voice in electing. Therefore, the
statute granting extraterritorial zoning power should be declared unconstitutional.
The court rejected this argument, stating that there is neither a constitutional nor
inherent right to local self-government. The court added that municipal offices are
created by the legislature, which can subject nonresidents to the jurisdiction of a
municipality if it so chooses.
31 Anderson, Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10 MINN. L. Rav. 564, 581 (1926).
7
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through legislatures and its exercise by elected officials in the
cities, towns, and counties. 8
Thus the basic question involved in determining the constitu-
tionality of the statute is not the power to zone but the disenfran-
chisement of the residents of the extraterritorial area. May the
state provide that residents of a geographical area be governed by
an adjacent municipality while prohibiting such residents from
voting in municipal elections or otherwise participating in the
municipal government? The past cases involving extraterritorial
jurisdiction cease to be reliable precedent since they do not address
the true constitutional question, which is not the power of the
municipality to zone, but rather the disenfranchisement of extra-
territorial residents.39
The issue of disenfranchisement, then, must be examined in
light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in voting
rights cases. Gray v. Sanders" and Reynolds v. Sims" extended the
one man, one vote principle to state elections, applying the equal
protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The judicial
focus, stated in Reynolds, "must be concentrated on ascertaining
whether there has been any discrimination against certain of the
State's citizens which constitutes an impermissible impairment of
their constitutionally protected right to vote."42 There is no ques-
tion that
the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the
franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticu-
lously scrutinized.43
The one man, one vote principle was then extended to local elec-
tions in Avery v. Midland County." Where the unit of local govern-
ment has general governmental powers, whether the state power
was exercised through the legislature or through local elected offi-
cials, the equal protection clause requires assurances that those
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
31 Becker, Municipal Boundaries & Zoning: Controlling Regional Land
Development, 1966 WASH. U. L. Q. 1.
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 561-62.
390 U.S. 474 (1968).
[Vol. 81
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qualified to vote have the right to an equally effective voice in the
election process.
Hadley v. Junior College District'5 represents a further appli-
cation of the one person, one vote formula by the United States
Supreme Court. In Hadley, the Court articulated the general rule
seemingly applicable to all levels of government: whenever a state
or local government decides to select persons by popular election
to perform governmental duties, equal protection requires that
each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to partici-
pate in that election. Thus, the application of the one man, one
vote principle hinges upon two related factors: a commitment to
the elective process with the elected officials performing govern-
mental functions.
4 6
This line of reasoning can readily be applied to the zoning
problem. The state clearly provides for the election of the local
governing body, both in municipalities and counties. This govern-
mental body performs a governmental function-among other du-
ties, it exercises the power to zone, delegated to it by the legisla-
ture. The appointed planning commission is not relevant to the
question since it merely serves in an advisory capacity to the mu-
nicipal governing body. In elections involving matters of general
interest to the community, voting is a fundamental right. Any
classification restricting the right to vote must demonstrate a com-
pelling state interest. 7 Clearly there is no compelling state interest
which justifies classifications discriminating between the residents
of the municipality and the residents of the extraterritorial area.
The classification must be subjected to the test established by the
Court in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15: "[w]hether
classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resident
citizens 'primarily interested' deny those excluded equal protec-
tion of the law depends, inter alia, on whether all those excluded
are in fact substantially less interested or affected than those the
statute includes.
48
While the Court concluded that the classification did not meet
the Kramer standard in a recent case involving the extraterritorial
exercise by a city of its police power over residents of a contiguous
397 U.S. 50 (1970).
" Blumstein, Party Reform, The Winner-Take-All Primary, and the California
Delegate Challenge: The Gold Rush Revisited, 25 VAND. L. REv. 975, 982 (1972).
7 Kramer v. Free Union School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
+" 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
9
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unincorporated community,49 it expressly reserved judgment on
such traditional authorities of local government as the power to
zone." In Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, the Court declared that
the one man, one vote principle had never been extended to resi-
dents residing outside of the geographical boundaries of the gov-
ernmental entity in question, while emphasizing that states are
free to choose their own form of internal government by creating
various types of political subdivisions." The concurring opinion
emphasizes that the holding does not make all exercises of extra-
territorial authority immune from attack, reiterating that the pow-
ers exercised by Tuscaloosa were limited and did not include the
power to zone property.2 The dissenters argue that the geographi-
cal residencyrequirement is entirely arbitrary and that no compel-
ling state interest has been demonstrated to justify withholding
the franchise from Holt's residents. 3
Significantly, then, the Court, speaking in both the majority
and concurring opinions, implies that it would find the extraterri-
torial exercise of zoning power a sufficient usurpation of traditional
local power to either declare the statute unconstitutional or, alter-
natively, extend the voting franchise to those residents affected by
the exercise of such power.
Therefore, it appears that in light of this most recent case, the
United States Supreme Court could find that residents of extrater-
ritorial areas have as great an interest in the regulation of their
property as do residents of the municipality in question. Under the
Kramer test, then, the classification must fall as denying equal
protection by subjecting these individuals to the jurisdiction of
local governing bodies whom they had no voice in electing.
Policy Considerations
There are no reported decisions in West Virginia which reveal
the policy justifications for restricting or excluding mobile homes
within the state. However, it appears reasonable to assume that
49 Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 99 S. Ct. 383 (1978). Holt is a small, unincor-
porated community located within the three-mile police jurisdiction of Tuscaloosa.
Its residents are subject to the city's police and sanitary regulations, the criminal
jurisdiction of the city's courts, and to the city's powers to license businesses, trades
and professions.
10 99 S. Ct. at 391-92, n. 8.
99 S. Ct. at 389-91.
52 99 S. Ct. at 393-94.
99 S. Ct. at 391-99.
[Vol. 81
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since West Virginia, like other jurisdictions, has local zoning ordi-
nances which exclude or otherwise restrict mobile home use, the
basic policies employed by other jurisdictions which afford similar
treatment to mobile homes would be equally applicable here.
Recently, a growing number of courts have begun to reexam-
ine policies developed in the past to exclude or otherwise restrict
mobile homes and have concluded, because of changing condi-
tions, that these restrictions no longer bear a reasonable relation
to the general welfare or are no longer necessary to protect the
municipality.5" The judicial trend towards the acceptance of mo-
bile homes involves two considerations: first, that restrictions on
different types of housing should be viewed more critically than
restrictions on non-housing; and secondly, that the critical shor-
tage of low and moderate income housing can be met by the in-
creased use of mobile homes.5
In large measure, mobile homes have been excluded from resi-
dential areas because they are not considered to be permanent
dwellings due to their potential for mobility. This policy was based
on the mobility of the early "house trailer," which was easily
pulled behind an automobile." Today, mobility is important only
in transporting the mobile home from the manufacturer to the
dealer, and then to the often permanent homesite. 7 Nevertheless,
courts continue to see no distinction between the house trailer and
the mobile home, both being designed and built as movable dwell-
ings." Even where the mobile home was found to be of a size
comparable to that of a conventional dwelling and set upon a
permanent foundation, it has nonetheless been deemed to be mov-
able and subject to regulation. 9
Generally, the courts have split in deciding whether a mobile
home ceases to be mobile when its wheels are removed and it is
firmly attached to a permanent foundation. Many jurisdictions
have realistically held that this modification transforms the home
into a permanent structure, allowing it to be placed in a location
which otherwise excludes mobile homes." As one court lamented,
' See generally, 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 10, at 13.
1 P. RoHAN, ZOMNG & LAND USE CONMOLS § 3.03 [3] (1968).
' 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 10, § 19.01.
57 HODES & ROBERSON, supra note 1, at 8.
*' Rutland v. Keiffer, 124 Vt. 357, 205 A.2d 400 (1964).
' Mobile Home Owners Protective Ass'n v. Chatham, 33 A.D.2d 78, 305
N.Y.S.2d 334 (1969).
Rezler v. Riverside, 28 ll. 2d 142, 190 N.E.2d 706 (1963); Rundell v. May,
11
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"[the mobile home's] sole curse seems to be that it was moved to
its present location and not built there." 1 It then deemed the home
in question to be a "prefabricated single family unit" permitted by
the zoning ordinance. This same distinction was used by another
jurisdiction to permit modular houses, while excluding mobile
homes because they were transported "complete" to the homesite
and required no further installation.6 2 What appears to be the most
extreme jurisdiction on this issue endorses the position "once a
trailer, always a trailer" or "a trailer is a trailer is a trailer." 3
The major difficulty appears to be that the courts focus on
whether the structure had ever been mobile and on its apparently
nonpermanent attachment to the land. This focus overlooks the
fact that conventional housing can be, and has been, placed on
flatbeds and moved to a different location.8' Mobile homes have
been recognized as dwellings, homes, and buildings for a variety
of other purposes-defense of one's home against intruders, stat-
utes relating to arson, insurance losses, homestead exemptions,
and building code regulations. 5 The different treatment for these
purposes is explained by the focus of the court: "What is dominant
* . . is the purpose for which it was built and used, and to which
it was primarily adapted. That purpose, to be used as a shelter and
habitation. . . a dwelling house. . . dominates the case." 6
The original house trailer was often deemed a health hazard
because it lacked running water and sanitary facilities and was
built in the absence of any construction standards. 7 Today's mo-
bile home construction, however, is governed by federal regula-
tions. Congress enacted the National Mobile Home Construction
and Safety Standards Act of 1974, in response to the concern over
construction standards, requiring the Department of Housing and
258 So.2d 90 (La. App. 1972); Board of Selectmen v. Garvey, 362 Mass. 821, 291
N.E.2d 593 (1973); Gillam v. Board of Health, 327 Mass. 621, 100 N.E.2d 687
(1951); Morin v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 102 R.I. 457, 232 A.2d 393 (1967); Lescault
v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 91 R.I. 277, 162 A.2d 807 (1960).
'5 Washington v. Work, 75 Wash.2d 204, 205, 449 P.2d 806, 807 (Wash. 1969).
Kyritsis v. Fenny, 66 Misc. 2d 392, 320 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1971).
Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning & Taxation, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 491,
501 (1970).
"Id. at 502.
HODES & ROBERSON, supra note 1, at 104.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, 108 F.2d 136, 138 (5th Cir. 1939); see also, Bartke
& Gage, supra note 63, at 498-99; HODES & ROBERSON, supra note 1, at 101-05.
9 Vickers v. Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962) (dissenting opinion),
appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963); Stary v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio
St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954); 2 A. RAmTTaop, supra note 10, § 19.01.
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Urban Development to establish Federal mobile home construc-
tion and safety standards. The standards, promulgated pursuant
to the Act, apply to all homes manufactured after June 15, 1976.5
At the same time, courts have recognized that the question of
whether a mobile home or mobile home park constitutes a public
health hazard is properly within the jurisdiction and power of the
boards of health rather than the local zoning authority. Any health
hazards which may be presented can easily be handled by the
board of health and do not necessitate a broad exercise of zoning
power.
69
Communities often disfavored mobile home parks, believing
them to be the cause of increased burdens on municipal services
while failing to contribute sufficient tax revenues to offset these
expenses. Adding to the problem is the fact that many states tax
mobile homes as personal property rather than real estate, 0 and
since personal property rates are generally lower, mobile home
owners frequently pay less property tax than do residents of other
types of dwellings." As was suggested by one state court, however,
if the personal property tax rate is "inequitable, the appropriate
course of action is a legislative change rather than the administra-
tive prohibition of [mobile homes] in an area where [mobile
home] parks are clearly a permitted use. '72 This court also re-
jected the municipality's contention that since the proposed mo-
bile home park would place a severe strain on the local school
system, the general welfare would be promoted by rejecting the
use. The court reiterated that the solution was to correct the im-
balance in taxation, rather than to prohibit a valid use.
At the same time courts are insisting that mobile home dwell-
ers are permanent residents of the community who work, vote and
pay taxes and who are entitled to benefit from the municipality's
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401 to 5426 (Supp. IV 1974).
Zoning Board of Adjustment v. Dragon Run Terrace, 222 A.2d 315 (Del.
1961); Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson, 225 Md. App. 379, 170 A.2d 768 (1961).
, E.g., W. VA. CODE § 11-5-3 (1974 Replacement Vol.). The statute defines
personal property as "all fixtures attached to the land, if not included in the valua-
tion of such land." Thus, a mobile home occupied by its owner but situated on
leased land is taxed as personal property with the real property tax on the land
assessed to the landowner. See Note, Housing-Mobile Homes-Some Legal
Questions, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 382, 382-91 (1973).
71 2 A. Rathfopf, supra note 10, § 19.01; Note, Housing-Mobile Homes-Some
Legal Questions, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 382, 382-91 (1973).
" Zoning Board of Adjustment v. Dragon Run Terrace, 222 A.2d 315, 319 (Del.
1961).
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services like any other homeowner.73 A number of recent decisions
have held that "problems inherent in an increase of population are
not sufficient to justify zoning restrictions which serve to ex-
clude."'" The inadequacies of existing sewage disposal facilities,
roads, police and fire protection, and school systems, which were
policies used in the past to justify restrictions, have today been
held to be insufficient to justify restrictions tending to prevent
population growth.
If mobile homes have helped to alleviate the problem of hous-
ing shortages, they have, in turn, created the problem of where to
put the mobile home. Although many people are willing to live in
mobile homes, it is dpparent that many others are unwilling to live
near mobile homes or mobile home parks.7 Yet, mobile home
parks are necessary for those who can afford to live in mobile
homes, but who cannot afford the price of land on which to place
one.
Relegating mobile homes to parks may have been a method
devised to protect residential neighbors from the harm they be-
lieved mobile homes to cause-the lowering of surrounding prop-
erty values. These municipalities were convinced that the failure
of the mobile home to conform to the neighboring housing stan-
dards would result in decreased property values in the neighbor-
hood.7 This difference in appearance became a significant factor
in the poor treatment mobile homes received, treatment which
continues today. To remove this threat to property owners, mobile
homes and parks were confined to commercially or industrially
zoned districts, rather than residential districts."
This confinement was considered justifiable under accepted
zoning principles of dividing the land mass into use districts ac-
cording to the area's suitability for a particular use, with uniform-
ity of that use within the district. According to this philosophy, the
mobile home park was not a residential use but a business, with
the owner of the land receiving financial benefits from leasing
space to the mobile home owner. The fallacy of this logic is in
looking not to the primary function of residential living, but the
Burroughs v. Board of County Comm'rs, 540 P.2d 233 (N.M. 1975).
' 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 10, § 17.04.
7' Moore, The Mobile Home & The Law, 6 AKRON L. Rav. 1, 2 (1973).
" 2 R. ANDERSON, AM. LAw op ZoNiNG § 11.49 (1968).
Colonial Park for Mobile Homes, Inc. v. New Britain Borough Zonirg Hear-
ing Bd., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 594, 290 A.2d 719 (1972) (dissenting opinions).
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incidental profitability to the landowner. 8 If the focus is properly
placed on the primary residential use, ordinances which restrict
mobile home parks to commercial areas become invalid for two
reasons. First, the ordinance is unreasonable and arbitrary because
it no longer bears a real and substantial relation to the health,
safety, or general welfare of the public. Second, under Euclidean
zoning principles,79 the residential use becomes incompatible with
the other uses properly contained in commercial and industrial
districts."0
The original purposes of Euclidean zoning, conserving prop-
erty values and encouraging the most appropriate use of land, were
to insure that all structures within the district were erected for the
same general purposes and with the same general characteristics.
It contemplated residential districts which excluded commercial
uses, and commercial districts which excluded residential uses.8"
Under these principles, at the very least, mobile homes and parks
should be placed in some type of residential district, rather than
the commercial or industrial zones for which they are unsuited.
Regardless of the concerns expressed for the general welfare to
justify zoning ordinances restricting or excluding mobile homes,
the essence of these policies appears to be aesthetic considerations.
The decision to permit or exclude mobile homes too often turns
upon how closely they resemble standard conventional housing.
82
11 Lakewood Estates, Inc. v. Deerfield Twp. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mich.
App. 184, 194 N.W.2d 511 (1971); BARTK & GAGE, supra note 63, at 498-99.
19 Euclidean zoning takes its name from the village of Euclid, which litigated
the landmark case Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The theory is
based on the premise that some uses of land are incompatible with others and that
more efficient employment of land resources would be achieved if incompatible uses
are clearly separated. The theory envisions that each community can be separated
into districts, each restricted to a particular use, such as: industrial, commercial
or residential occupation. However sound in theory Euclidean zoning appears to be,
it has proven to be less practical in its application. It is seldom that an existing
community can be tidily arranged into separate and mutually exclusive use dis-
tricts. State and local legislators, however, for the most part continue to use the
Euclidean zoning theory in designing comprehensive zoning plans. 1 R. ANDERSON,
AM. LAw OF ZONING § 6.02 (2d ed. 1976).
HODES & ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 225-28.
" Rundell v. May, 258 So.2d 90 (La. 1972); Vickers v. Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J.
232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962) (dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 371
U.S. 233 (1963).
11 Kyritsis v. Fenny, 66 Misc.2d 392, 320 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1971); Charleston, W.
Va., Rev. Zoning Ordinance § 8.09.01 (1969) (repealed by Ordinance No. 1279, Nov.
6, 1972). Section 8.09.01 permitted mobile homes on a solid foundation provided
that the "exterior design does not have a deleterious effect on the surrounding
15
Tucker: Mobile Homes: A Partial Solution to West Virginia's Housing Probl
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Zoning for purely aesthetic purposes has rarely received judi-
cial sanction. It appears difficult to accommodate varying individ-
ual tastes when formulating a precise standard, while a vague
standard will too often be susceptible to discriminatory use and
enforcement. Additionally, the courts generally defer to the gov-
erning body's best judgment as to what zoning restrictions are
necessary to promote the health, safety and general welfare of the
community. This deference presupposes that such actions are
taken conscientiously, sincerely and honestly for the general wel-
fare. Thus, if local officials may zone for appearance because a use
is unsightly or does not contribute to the general appearance of the
community or enhance the value of local real estate, under the
guise of the general welfare, they can just as easily exclude any use
which they find unsightly. This would constitute control of uses by
individual preference and prejudice.u
Perhaps for these reasons, the generally accepted rule is that
the exercise of zoning power is not justified by purely aesthetic
considerations." In an early West Virginia case the court refused
to sustain a municipal ordinance based solely on aesthetic
grounds. The court considered the weight of authority and then
existing population conditions to preclude the regulation of prop-
erty on mere aesthetics which had no reasonable reference to the
safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public.8 The issue
of how much weight to give aesthetic considerations was later reex-
amined by the West Virginia court, which frankly acknowledged
that aesthetics presented a difficult question." The court found the
earlier adopted principle precluding pure aesthetics to be diluted
by subsequent decisions in West Virginia and other jurisdictions
stating that aesthetics are properly considered as a factor in zoning
restrictions, but alone are insufficient justification. The court then
neighborhood" and to the "greatest extent possible have the appearance of a single
family residence of normal construction." Nicholas County has recently enacted an
amendment to their zoning ordinance which allows modular homes as residential
dwellings on permanent foundations, but disallows mobile homes on individual lots
because they are capable of being moved. Nicholas County, W. Va., Zoning Ordi-
nance (October, 1978).
Note, Aesthetic Zoning, 11 URBAN L. ANN. 295, 295-96 (1976).
' Vickers v. Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962) (dissenting
opinion), appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
Peck v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969).
, Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915).
Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960).
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adopted the view that "within essential limitations aesthetics have
a proper place in the community affairs of modem society."
Although several jurisdictions have adopted pure aesthetic
zoning, the question has been left open by the United States Su-
preme Court. 89 Its early landmark decision in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co."5 did not address the question since the asserted state
interest there was the protection of health and safety, not the
aesthetic value of the use. In a more recent case, the Court found
the concept of public welfare to be so broad and inclusive as to
embrace purely aesthetic values. However, the case concerned a
compensated taking under the eminent domain power of the fed-
eral government, not an exercise of zoning power. It may be fairly
concluded that while a state may lawfully consider aesthetics as a
factor in zoning, there is some doubt whether the United States
Supreme Court would sanction aesthetics alone to justify exclu-
sionary or restrictive zoning.
Many courts have found they can circumvent this difficulty
by disguising the pure aesthetic purpose of a zoning ordinance
behind dubious health or safety justifications or by expansion of
the general welfare definition to permit aesthetic zoning to protect
property values. While a few jurisdictions have upheld pure aes-
thetic zoning, the ordinance must still satisfy due process and
equal protection requirements. It must serve a public, not private,
interest; it must be rationally formulated and fairly administered;
and it must be calculated to achieve the desired purposes.
At the very least, pure aesthetic zoning allows the community
to openly express its aesthetic preferences without resorting to pur-
ported general welfare justifications. Aesthetic zoning also allows
the individual to directly attack the aesthetic question, rather than
attempting to refute a nonexistent justification. The difficulty
lies in determining what is reasonable and rational as opposed to
what is unreasonable and arbitrary. The individual who sees a
mobile home as his only alternative to inadequate housing is often
1 Id. at 45, 119 S.E.2d at 847, citing Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v.
Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368 (1937).
11 Note, Aesthetic Zoning, 11 URBAN L. ANN. 295, 299 (1976).
:0 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
" Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
'2 Note, Aesthetic Zoning, 11 URBA L. ANN. 295, 302 (1976).
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precluded from placing the home on his own property, or in a
mobile home park, because the community in general desires only
housing which resembles the standard single family dwelling.
Evidence that mobile homes are indeed regulated on the basis
of pure aesthetics is apparent from the differing treatment afforded
to modular housing. One jurisdiction distinguished modular hous-
ing on the following grounds:
While a mobile home is now available in expandable and
double-wide .units which create a more "homelike" appearance,
the concept of a mobile home is entirely different than that of
a modular home. A mobile home is a single entity which when
placed on a building site is completed and needs no further
installation of a heating system or materials. A modular home
is transported to the construction site in several pieces.
Moreover, a modular home is indistinguishable in appearance
from conventionally built homes while a mobile home cannot be
easily mistaken for a conventional dwelling.5
The court further concluded that the current housing crisis makes
it unreasonable to exclude modular homes from residential zones
due to the need for more readily available housing at lower costs.
Under this justification, analogous reasoning should also apply to
the mobile home. Clearly, such reasoning is not applied in the case
of mobile homes because of their inability to merge into the
identity of conventional neighborhoods.
The answer to the continuing dilemma between mobile homes
and aesthetics is perhaps best articulated in the following state-
ment:
[I]t is arbitrary to permit the prohibition of mobile home
parks completely in a municipality where they can be placed in
appropriate districts and in which there is a need or demand for
them. To hold otherwise would be to allow any method of hous-
ing to be outlawed by local whim. I cannot understand how...
a mobile home park can have a detrimental'effect on the value
of all property in the township or on its overall attractiveness
any more than industrial and commercial districts or even small
lot housing developments.
Moreover, the aesthetic warrant for the prohibition ... is
not a reasonable basis for the exercise of zoning power in the
situation. . . . [It certainly is not enough to sanction exclu-
sion of a particular use on the sole ground that its appearance
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offends the subjective sensibilities of the local governing
body .... Letting a use be controlled by individual preferences
and prejudices, devoid of standards entirely, is the antithesis of
proper judicial review of zoning ordinances."
Exclusionary Zoning
Since the landmark decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.17 in 1926, there has been little
question concerning the constitutionality of zoning per se.18 Euclid
provided the standard test used to determine the constitutionality
of a particular zoning ordinance or statute: the provision must be
rational and reasonable, having a real and substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Constitution-
ality is also dependent upon authorization by the state's enabling
statute."2
The general principles applicable to judicial review of the va-
lidity of zoning ordinances are well settled. The legislative branch
of a local government in the exercise of its police power has wide
discretion in the enactment of zoning ordinances. Its action is pre-
sumed to be valid so long as it is not unreasonable and arbitrary.
The burden of proof lies with the party challenging the ordinance
to prove that it is clearly unreasonable or arbitrary, and that it
bears no reasonable and substantial relation to the public interests
enumerated above. An additional presumption to be overcome
rests on the rule that the courts will not substitute their judgment
for that of the legislative body, and if the reasonableness of a
zoning ordinance is fairly debatable it must be sustained."' This
places two serious burdens of proof upon the party challenging the
zoning ordinance. Until recently, the mechanical application of
these principles appeared to make it virtually impossible for a
municipal ordinance to be successfully attacked. Yet recent court
decisions have shown that more courts are now willing to be per-
suaded by clear and convincing evidence and some courts are pre-
" Vickers v. Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232, 268-69, 181 A.2d 129, 149 (1962)
(dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9X Flippen, Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances Which Exclude Mobile
Homes, 12 Am. Bus. L.J. 15, 17 (1974).
" Id. at 18.
"' Vickers v. Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962) (dissenting
opinion), appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963); G-M Realty, Inc.
v. Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961); Carter v. Bluefield, 132 W. Va.
881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
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pared to resolve the conflict in favor of the plaintiff even where the
validity of the ordinance appears to be fairly debatable.''
"Exclusionary zoning may assume a wide variety of forms.
Ultimately, the existence of such practices must be measured by
exclusionary intent and actual or potential exclusionary effect."'' 2
The most common method is the ordinance which is exclusionary
per se, that is, it patently prohibits the placing of mobile homes
on any property within the corporate limits of the municipality. A
number of municipalities in West Virginia have this type of ordi-
nance. ' Other ordinances commonly allow mobile homes only in
mobile home parks which must conform to minimum lot size or
subdivision regulation requirements.' 4 Burdened by these strin-
gent requirements, the park becomes economically unfeasible and
the developer abandons the project. The use is then effectively
excluded because the cost to develop the parks is prohibitive.
A similar result occurs where the zoning ordinance does per-
mit mobile homes or mobile home parks in a particular zoning
district, but the size of the district in which the use is allowed is
so small in relation to the remaining municipal land mass as vir-
WI Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1210 (1973); 1 ANDERSON, AM. LAW OF ZONING § 2.14-
2.19 (1968).
112 Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 197, 336 A.2d
713, 737 (1975) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 803 (1975).
11 E.g., Eleanor, W. Va., Municipal Code § 78-2 (1978); Parkersburg, W. Va.,
Zoning Ordinance § 1363.03 (Feb. 27, 1973); Charleston, W. Va., Rev. Zoning
Ordinance No. 1279 (Nov. 6, 1972).
' Jefferson County, W. Va., Subdivision Ordinance (June 8, 1972) (amend-
ment May 7, 1973). The 1973 amendment pertains to the placement of mobile
homes. The county currently does not have a comprehensive zoning plan (a pro-
posed comprehensive ordinance was defeated by referendum); therefore, mobile
homes may be placed by permit on any land within the county. However, where
more than one mobile home is placed on the same tract of land it is then regulated
as a subdivision. It must conform to the following subdivision regulations: paved
roads, gutters and curbs, central sewage and water, all utilities placed underground,
subdivision review, and a plan and plat recorded at the courthouse. Nitro, W. Va.,
Zoning Ordinance (Oct. 6, 1970). This ordinance requires mobile home parks to be
established and operated under the standards of Kanawha County and the state.
Specific zoning requirements are: two-acre site with 2,400 square feet net area per
mobile home, off-street parking, setbacks, and six-foot enclosure of fire-resistant
materials or natural growth. Beckley, W. Va., Zoning Ordinance (1971), in which
the city limits parks to six-acre tracts, allowing 3,600 square feet for each home.
Nicholas County, W. Va., Zoning Ordinance (March 13, 1965), in which Nicholas
County limits mobile homes to parks on the areas of ten acres or more, designed to
accommodate 50 or more homes with 3,000 square feet per home.(The zoning ordi-
nance covers only a portion of the county, see infra note 111).
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tually to exclude the use."0 5 Exclusion of a use can also be achieved
by providing for the use within the municipality, but failing to
attach that use to any particular area, thereby creating a "floating
zone."'06 Alternatively, exclusion would apparently result where a
fair amount of land is zoned for a use, but it must compete with a
large number of other approved uses which effectively use up the
available area.
Apart from total exclusion, a zoning ordinance allowing the
use of mobile home parks may be held invalid where the zoning
ordinance fails to provide the municipality with specific guidelines
for park development. Allowing permission to be granted or denied
on the mere whim of the zoning board increases the likelihood that
the municipality will act arbitrarily in approving or denying appli-
cations to establish a park.' Similar results are likely to occur
where mobile homes are permitted on individual lots by permit
only with no specific requirements to guide local officials in ap-
proving the permits.
In the judicial review of exclusionary ordinances a significant
factor has become the outward population expansion from urban
areas and the corresponding pressures placed on the suburbs to
provide low and moderate cost housing to meet this expansion. In
the past, most courts have tended towards an increasingly broad
interpretation of the general welfare and, in particular, to look
upon aesthetic objectives and considerations as properly falling
within the meaning and scope of the general welfare. It is clear that
many zoning restrictions which tend to have an exclusionary effect
bear only minimal relation to the health, safety, or morals of a
community, and that they tend to promote the general welfare
only from an aesthetic standpoint.'
Recently, progressive courts have redefined the concept of the
general welfare to encompass the welfare of the region, rather than
limiting it, as local officials would prefer, to the territorial limits
of the municipality. These courts are not advocating extraterrito-
rial zoning but instead zoning which contemplates the needs and
desires of the region. In addition, in weighing the interest of the
"1 Nickola v. Grand Blanc, 394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975) (the district
included approximately one-tenth of one percent of the municipality's total
acreage).
"0 Smookler v. Wheatfield, 394 Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 616 (1975).
"1 Lakewood Estates, Inc. v. Deerfield Twp. Zon. Bd. of Appeals, 37 Mich.
App. 184, 194 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
"I Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1210, 1219 (1973).
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general welfare, aesthetic considerations are balanced against cur-
rent pressing housing needs and the movement out of urban areas
into the suburbs. Finally, these courts disfavor zoning which bears
little relation to the "public" as opposed to the "private" welfare,
in particular, those ordinances enacted primarily to avoid the in-
creased governmental costs and burdens accompanying the influx
of lower income persons." 9
All of the factors previously discussed, and those which follow,
must be taken into consideration in examining the current zoning
practices by West Virginia's municipalities and counties. Many
municipalities presently exclude mobile homes totally, or restrict
their placement within the municipal boundaries in some man-
ner.110 While most of the counties do not have comprehensive zon-
ing plans which encompass mobile home uses, many have made
attempts to do so."' If municipalities may exclude mobile homes
on the justification that unincorporated areas of the counties will
accommodate them, and subsequently, counties are permitted to
exclude them, the result will be total prohibition of a use which is
beneficial to the state. The same policies which led other courts to
move against exclusionary zoning in the examples which follow
must of necessity be adopted by the West Virginia judiciary in
striking down exclusionary ordinances within the state.
The Michigan Supreme Court appears to be the most ada-
mant in striking down zoning ordinances which either directly or
indirectly exclude mobile homes. This court has invalidated ordi-
nances which totally prohibit the operation of mobile home parks
within the municipality."' Where the lack of extensive develop-
ment of a township provides adequate space for growth, prohibi-
tion of mobile home parks bears no real or substantial relation to
10 Id.
11 See notes 103, 104 supra.
" Nicholas County, W. Va., Zoning Ordinance (March 13, 1975). The Nicho-
las County Planning Commission had recommended a comprehensive zoning plaai
to the County Commission in March of 1965. At public hearings the residents of
the county so strenuously objected to the zoning that the comprehensive ordinance
was not--enacted for the entire county, but was limited to the area surrounding
Summersville Lake. Jefferson County attempted to enact a comprehensive ordi-
nance which limited mobile homes on private land to farm tenant dwellings or
temporary shelter during construction of a permanent residence. Mobile homes
parks would have been limited as planned unit developments, only after submission
of a community impact statement. The plan was adopted by the county commis-
sion, but rejected by referendum prior to 1972.
11Z Gust v. Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955).
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the present public health, safety, morals or general welfare. The
court has further emphasized that upholding the validity of zoning
ordinances which totally exclude would be tantamount to declar-
ing mobile homes a nuisance per se. In addition, exclusionary zon-
•ing based on the expectation of future industrial expansion has
been. rejected by the court as giving unlimited power to the zoning
board, to be measured only by the limit of the board's expectations
and beliefs."'
The Michigan court has also addressed the validity of zoning
ordinances which limit the size of mobile home parks."' Prior judi-
cial recognition of the mobile home park as a legitimate land use,
combined with the housing shortage, has given the use a "favored
status." Where the favored use is appropriate for a given site, such
as the mobile home park in question, the presumed validity of the
restrictive ordinance fades and the burden shifts to the municipal-
ity to justify its exclusion. The court has found protection of the
mobile home park to be a favored use of increased importance
in view of the massive nationwide housing shortage which ne-
cessitates a re-defining of the term "general welfare" as applied
to justify residential zoning. That term is not a mere catchword
to permit the translation of narrow desires into ordinances
which discriminate against or operate to exclude certain resi-
dential uses deemed beneficial. Citizens of the general com-
munity have a right to decently placed, suitable housing within
their means and such right must be a consideration in assessing
the reasonableness of local zoning prescribing residential re-
quirements or prohibitions. Such zoning may never stand where
its primary purpose is shown to operate for the exclusion of a
certain element of residential dwellers."5
That court also looked with disfavor on ordinances which indi-
rectly exclude mobile homes, invalidating districts too insignifi-
cant in size to permit mobile home park development"' and zoning
classifications not attached to any specific land.' Clearly, Michi-
" Id. at 442, 70 N.W.2d at 774.
" Bristow v. Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971) (limiting
size to 75 units bears no relation to health, safety or general welfare and effectively
excludes mobile home parks).
"5 Id. at 217, 192 N.W.2d at 327-28.
"6 Nickola v. Grand Blanc, 394 Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975) (less than
one-tenth of one percent of township's land zoned to permit mobile home parks plus
the refusal to permit expansion of two existing parks found tantamount to exclu-
sion).
-7 Smookler v. Wheatfield, 394 Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 616 (1975).
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gan has adopted the policy that a township cannot enact zoning
ordinances designed to prevent the influx of natural population
expansion to avoid future burdens, economic or otherwise, upon
the administration of public services and facilities, where it is
apparent that the general welfare of the community is not pro-
moted."' The pressing need for housing is deemed to be of greater
importance than the desire of the community to avoid increased
burdens on municipal services.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has established a judicial
precedent of invalidating exclusionary zoning ordinances. Mini-
mum lot size requirements so large as to be exclusionary in effect,
serving private rather than public interests, have been rejected as
zoning ordinances primarily designed to prevent the entrance of
newcomers "to avoid the increased responsibilities and economic
burdens which time and natural growth invariably bring.""' Ex-
clusionary ordinances involving apartment developments have
been struck down by the Pennsylvania court as prohibitive of those
in search of suitable housing:
Apartment living is a fact of life that communities like Nether
Providence must learn to accept. If [the township] is located
so that it is a place where apartment living is in demand, it
must provide for apartments in its plan for future growth; it
cannot be allowed to close its doors to others seeking a
"comfortable place to live."'"
The same court appears reluctant to invalidate indirect exclu-
sionary zoning of mobile homes, finding an excessive minimum lot
size requirement for mobile home parks did not unreasonably fail
to provide for the use.' The dissenting judge in the case noted that
while mobile homes should be required to meet reasonable regula-
tions applicable to all other dwellings, "if any of those regulations
can be determined to be designed to unreasonably restrict a usage
intended for an otherwise legitimate use, such as providing a resi-
dence for people, it should be stricken as a violation of the consti-
tutional right to use property."' " Clearly, the neighboring property
owners have seen the mobile home park as a threat to their privacy
" Green v. Lima Twp., 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972).
"' National Land & Dev. Co. v. Easttown Twp., 419 Pa. 504,528, 215 A.2d 597,
610 (1965) (four-acre minimum lot size).
"I Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 246, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970). See also, Surrick
v. Zoning Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1978).
I Colonial Park for Mobile Homes, Inc. v. New Britain Borough Zoning Hear-
ing Bd., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 594, 290 A.2d 719 (1972).
'1 Id. at 608-09, 290 A.2d at 726-27 (citation omitted).
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and to real estate values, while disregarding the needs of their
fellow citizens. Finally, the dissent declared "[z]oning ordinances
must not be used to accomplish indirectly that which cannot be
accomplished directly, i.e., total prohibition of an otherwise legiti-
mate use.' 'In
The New Jersey Supreme Court has redefined "general wel-
fare" to specifically include an affirmative obligation to provide
the opportunity for "an appropriate variety and choice of housing,
for all categories of people."lu Although the court has not changed
the existing Euclid test of constitutionality, by establishing a
much stricter and demanding definition of the general welfare it
has made it more difficult for zoning ordinances to pass the consti-
tutional test. Thus, a zoning ordinance which acts to foreclose the
availability of low and moderate income housing will be stricken
as an exclusionary ordinance.' Additionally, New Jersey decisions
have stressed the developing community's obligation to afford the
opportunity for decent and adequate low and moderate income
housing in relation to present and prospective regional needs."8
A later New Jersey decision upheld an ordinance permitting
mobile home parks to be established only under certain conditions,
in particular limiting residents to persons fifty-two years of age or
older.' Such an ordinance clearly promotes the general welfare of
the community by providing much needed affordable housing for
the elderly. However, the court stressed it would look to the true
222 Id. at 611, 290 A.2d at 728.
2 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 803 (1975). The court invalidated pervasive exclu-
sionary zoning restrictions which included multifamily housing so designed as to
benefit only the relatively affluent, overly large minimum lot size, frontage and
floor space requirements, and excessive zoning for industrial and related uses (al-
most 30% or 4100 acres, while present industrial development occupied only 100
acres).
225 Note, Zoning-Restrictions on Mobile Homes: The Beginning of the End?,
55 N.C.L. REv. 1289, 1293 n.32 (1977).
22I Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 188, 336
A.2d 713, 732 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 803 (1975); Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
I" Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Twp., 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976). The
court emphasized that its "failure to probe more deeply into the possible exclusion-
ary effect of similar ordinances should not be understood to be the product of
blindness to their potentially exclusionary character, but only the consequences of
the plaintiffs' decision not to try the case on that legal theory." Id. at 295-96, 336
A.2d at 1041. See also, Note, Zoning-Restrictions on Mobile Homes: The Beginning
of the End?, 55 N.C.L. Rxv. 1289 (1977).
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character of the zoning device. If it substantially contributes to an
overall pattern of improper exclusion, the fact that it is beneficial
to a particular group will not justify the zoning provision.
Thus, the door is left open for New Jersey to strike down
zoning ordinances totally excluding mobile homes. Its recent case
history invalidating exclusionary zoning ordinances in other con-
texts and its persuasive arguments emphasizing the contribution
to the general welfare provided by the mobile home can be used
to invalidate remaining regulatory barriers to the socially benefi-
cial use of mobile homes.
Equal protection may become an important legal argument
against exclusionary zoning, which segregates people on the basis
of economic status thereby denying them access to suitable hous-
ing."'8 Low income families usually are members of minority
groups, so that in purpose and effect exclusionary zoning is often
analogous to exclusion on racial grounds.12 Where restrictions
which unreasonably increase housing costs for low and moderate
income families are invalidated, housing is then made available to
those families which are also minorities.
Lower federal courts have utilized the equal protection ration-
ale to strike ordinances having an exclusionary effect on low in-
come groups.' The United States Supreme Court directly con-
fronted the issue of exclusionary zoning, but declined to reach any
decision, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 3, How-
ever, the Court did state that if a zoning ordinance and its pattern
of enforcement have had the purpose and effect of excluding per-
sons of low and moderate income, including members of minority
"I Flippen, Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances Which Exclude Mobile
Homes, 12 AM. Bus. L.J. 15, 22 (1974).
' Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d
291 (9th Cir. 1970).
"I Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawannaa 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
Dailey involved a proposed low-income housing project in a predominately white
neighborhood. The city refused to issue a building permit or rezone the lot after
receiving a petition against the project from 250 white residents of the neighbor-
hood. The court found it was enough for the plaintiff to show the local officials were
effectuating the discriminatory designs of private individuals. The city also urged
denial of the permit on the grounds of overcrowding local schools and overburdening
local fire fighting capabilities, which the court found unpersuasive since the neigh-
borhood was an area already zoned for high-density housing. See also, Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 803 (1975).
131 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
[Vol. 81
26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss2/6
MOBILE HOME ZONING
groups, such intentional exclusionary practices would be invalida-
ted, if proven in a proper case. 3 '
Conclusion
By examining the major decisions from jurisdictions which
have reached the issue of exclusionary zoning as it pertains to
mobile homes and other uses, the policies considered by these
courts are fully disclosed. The same policies and considerations
these progressive courts seek to promote should also be the policies
adopted by the West Virginia judiciary. The exclusionary devices
explored in this Note, for the most part exist in West Virginia. As
these decisions reveal, the time has come to reexamine the needs
of both the community and the state and to redefine the concept
of the general welfare. West Virginia communities can no longer
afford to ignore the pressing needs of the general "public" welfare,
especially when as much as twenty-seven percent of the existing
housing stock is substandard and the need for new housing is in-
creasing at a rate the conventional housing industry cannot meet.
It is readily apparent that a statement made in 1905 has more
relevance than ever to today's current dilemma: Aesthetic consid-
erations are "a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of
necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of
the police power to take private property without compensa-
tion."'' Zoning officials must recognize "beyond dispute that pro-
per provision for adequate housing of all categories of people is
certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare
required in all local land use regulation."''
Vicki Obenchain Tucker
' Id. at 502.
' City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, Advertisng & Sign Painting Co.,
72 N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (1905).
"' Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 179, 336
A.2d 713, 727 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 803 (1975).
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